02 03 petitioner IFP status, see Dkt. No. 4, but has not directed service of his petition. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that petitioner's § 2254 petition be DENIED and this case DISMISSED without prejudice.

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## II. DISCUSSION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No.

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## A. <u>Petitioner's Habeas Claims Are Unexhausted</u>

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were convicted in state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In order for a federal district court to review the merits of a § 2254 petition, the petitioner must first exhaust his state court

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remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); Fields v. Waddington, 401 F.3d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir.

104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996), governs petitions for habeas corpus filed by prisoners who

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2005). The purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to preserve federal-state comity which, in this setting, provides state courts an initial opportunity to correct violations of its prisoners'

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federal rights. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241,

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251 (1886). A petitioner can satisfy the exhaustion requirement by either (1) fairly and fully presenting each of his federal claims to the highest state court from which a decision can be

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rendered, or (2) demonstrating that no state remedies are available to him. *Johnson v. Zenon*,

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20 F 24 929 920 (0th Cir. 1006). A maticion of faints and falls assessed a claim if he authorite is

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88 F.3d 828, 829 (9th Cir. 1996). A petitioner fairly and fully presents a claim if he submits it

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"(1) to the proper forum, (2) through the proper vehicle, and (3) by providing the proper factual and legal basis for the claim." *Insyxiengmay v. Morgan*, 403 F.3d 657, 668 (9th Cir.

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2005) (internal citations omitted).

The Ninth Circuit requires that a habeas petitioner explicitly identify the federal basis of his claims by identifying specific portions of the Constitution or federal statutes, or by citing federal or state case law that analyzes the Constitution. *Insyxiengmay*, 403 F.3d at 668; *Fields*, 401 F.3d at 1021. Alluding to broad constitutional principles, without more, does not satisfy the exhaustion requirement. *Id.* Although *pro se* petitioners may be entitled to more leniency than habeas petitioners with counsel, *Sanders v. Ryder*, 342 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir.

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PAGE – 2

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2003), such petitioners ordinarily do not satisfy the exhaustion requirement if the state court must read beyond their motion in order to ascertain their claims. *Baldwin v. Reese*, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004).

Here, it is clear from the face of the petition that petitioner has not exhausted any of the grounds for relief presented therein. *See* Dkt. No. 1-1 at 2-12. Petitioner insists that no direct appeal was available or applicable, and implies that his lack of knowledge and lack of assistance from the public defender's office obviates the exhaustion requirement. The Court disagrees. The claims presented by petitioner that call into question the validity of his conviction appear to be claims eligible for review in the state courts. Even assuming that a direct appeal was not available to petitioner, the Washington Rules of Appellate Procedure provide an avenue through which a petitioner may seek review of a restraint which is alleged to be unlawful. *See* R.A.P. 16.4. Petitioner apparently made no effort to seek review of his restraints under the provisions of that rule. In sum, petitioner has made no effort to exhaust his federal habeas claims in the state courts, those claims are not eligible for federal habeas review.

## B. Petitioner's Prison Condition Claims Are Not Cognizable Under § 2254

In certain sections of plaintiff's petition, he appears to be challenging the conditions, as opposed to the validity, of his confinement. *See* Dkt. No. 1-1 at 7, 19-20, 25-27, 30-31. Such allegations, as well as petitioner's claim for monetary relief attendant thereto, are not cognizable under the legal framework of habeas corpus, and should instead be brought in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See, e.g., Nelson v. Campbell*, 541 U.S. 637, 643 (2004) ("[C]onstitutional claims that merely challenge the conditions of a prisoner's confinement, whether the inmate seeks monetary or injunctive relief, fall outside" the core of habeas corpus.); *Muhammad v. Close*, 540 U.S. 749, 749 (2004) (per curiam) ("Challenges to the validity of any confinement . . . are the province of habeas corpus; requests for relief turning on circumstances of confinement may be presented in a § 1983 action.").

01 III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that petitioner's § 2254 petition be DENIED and this case DISMISSED without prejudice. A proposed order accompanies this Report and Recommendation.

DATED this 15th day of October, 2007.

SAMES P. DONOHUE

United States Magistrate Judge

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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION PAGE – 4